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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether Judge Jones correctly deemed Progressive's Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts admitted where Randall failed to comply with Rule 
7(c)(3)(B). In cases where the non-moving party failed to controvert the moving 
party's statement of facts, the trial court must deem the facts admitted as an 
operation of law. Therefore, the appellate court reviews that decision for 
correctness. USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2010 UT 31, fl30,235 P.3d 749 (Utah 
2010). 
2. Whether Judge Jones abused his discretion in considering 
circumstantial evidence of the contents of the UIM rejection form that Randall signed 
where the original was lost or destroyed. The trial court has broad discretion to 
admit or exclude evidence and the appellate courts will only disturb its ruling for 
abuse of discretion. Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49, fl43, 221 P.3d 
205 (Utah 2009). 
3. Whether Judge Jones correctly decided that Progressive was entitled 
to summary judgment on Randall's declaratory judgment claim. "A trial court's 
decision to grant or deny a motion for summary judgment is a legal one and will be 
reviewed for correctness." Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, fl13, 
70 P.3d 35 (Utah 2003). 
100.243 1 
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STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305.3 states in relevant part: 
(2)(g) (i) A named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage 
by an express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage 
under Subsection 31 A-22-302(1)(a). 
(ii) A written rejection under this Subsection (2)(g) shall be on a form 
provided by the insurer that includes a reasonable explanation of the 
purpose of underinsured motorist coverage and when it would be 
applicable. 
(iii) A written rejection under this Subsection (2)(g) continues for that 
issuer of the liability coverage until the insured in writing requests 
underinsured motorist coverage from that liability insurer. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 1004 states in relevant part: 
The original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a 
writing, recording, or photograph is admissible if: 
(1) Originals lost or destroyed. All originals are lost or have been 
destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad 
faith.. . 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(c)(3)(B) states: 
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain 
a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts 
in dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the 
opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any 
dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits 
or discovery materials. For any additional facts set forth in the opposing 
memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and 
supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or 
discovery materials. 
9 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In June of 2005, Schroader-Blackley Insurance Agency ("Schroader-Blackely") 
assisted Rex Randall and his wife, Jackie, in applying for an insurance contract with 
Progressive. As part of that application process, Randall was presented with a form 
provided by Progressive that he signed rejecting underinsured motorist ("UIM") 
coverage. Randall's application for insurance was uploaded electronically, and the 
signed documents were retained in the office of Schroader-Blackley. Schroader-
Blackley retained the documents for four years, exceeding the state-mandated 
retention period by one year, but discarded the documents prior to the time Randall 
desired to make a claim for UIM benefits. 
Randall was involved in an automobile accident on May 18, 2006. In 2010, 
he settled with the driver of the other vehicle and made a claim to obtain additional 
money for his injuries from Progressive. Progressive denied Randall's claim 
because he had rejected UIM coverage and had not paid a premium for UIM 
coverage. Randall demanded to see the UIM rejection form, but it was not available 
due to the fact that Schroader-Blackley had disposed of it one year prior to Randall's 
claim. 
Randall has erroneously urged the Court to allow him to avoid the 
consequences of his decision to reject UIM coverage by reforming his insurance 
contract simply because Progressive is unable to physically produce the UIM 
rejection form he signed. Randall has alleged he did not sign a UIM rejection form, 
but he has failed to support that allegation with any competent evidence. 
100.243 3 
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Progressive, on the other hand, has presented competent evidence that 
Randall signed a UIM rejection form that complied with Utah law. Despite the fact 
that the original document has been lost, the evidence demonstrates that Randall 
rejected underinsured motorist coverage that Progressive presented him with a UIM 
rejection form to sign. 
Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, Judge Jones granted summary 
judgment for Progressive and denied Randall's motion for summary judgment. This 
Court should affirm that decision because the undisputed material facts show that 
Progressive is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
On June 3, 2005, Plaintiff Rex Randall worked through a local insurance 
brokerage, Schroader-Blackley Insurance, to contract with Progressive for the 
purchase of automobile insurance on his 1989 Ford Escort. (R. 0145-46, 0149-50, 
0160.) On May 18, 2006, Randall was involved in a motor vehicle accident in the 
1989 Ford Escort and has since made a claim against Progressive for underinsured 
motorist ("UIM") coverage. (R. 0178-79.) 
Maria Warby was the agent from Schroader-Blackley that worked with Randall 
to apply for the insurance contract. (R. 0167-70, 0149, 0153.) Warby obtained 
information from Randall and then entered the information into an electronic 
application that was uploaded to Progressive with the Randalls' selections on 
coverage. Id. Warby printed insurance policy forms generated by Progressive and 
had the Randalls sign the forms. The owner of Blackley-Schroader Insurance 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Agency, testified that "[a]ccording to which policy you're issuing, which coverages 
you are selecting, the insurance company . . . software will print out the forms that 
need to be signed and then we review that with the customer, obtain the signatures, 
obtain the down payment and issue the policy." (R. 0153.) Randall recalled 
providing several signatures on a multiple page automobile insurance application 
form, but could not recall what the form contained or how many signatures it 
required. (R. 0174-75.) 
After reviewing the insurance policy forms with the Randalls and their 
selections, the Randalls signed the insurance application in several places. (R. 
0167-70). The form Randall signed provided an explanation of Underinsured 
Motorist Coverage, as well as the different premiums for different UIM coverages 
selected. (R. 0187-88, 0190.) The form stated: 
I have been offered and I waive the option to purchase Underinsured Motorist 
Bodily Injury Coverage in an amount equal to the limits of my bodily injury 
liability coverage. Instead, as shown below, I either: 1) elect lower limits of 
Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage; or 2) reject the option to 
purchase any Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage. 
I understand that Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage protects me, 
my resident relatives, and occupants of a covered vehicle if any of us sustains 
bodily injury, including any resulting death, in an accident in which the owner 
or operator of a motor vehicle who is legally liable does not have enough 
insurance (an underinsured motorist). 
I understand and agree that the election or rejection below shall be binding on 
all persons insured under the policy, and that it shall apply to any renewal, 
reinstatement, substitute, amended, altered, modified, or replacement policy 
with this company or any affiliated company, unless a named insured revokes 
it or selects a different option. 
100.243 5 
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I waive the option to purchase Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage 
in an amount equal to the limits of my bodily injury liability coverage and either 
elect the following limits for Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage or 
reject Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage. 
Id. The form then offered the purchaser a selection of available limits with premiums 
and provided a form by which the purchaser could reject UIM coverage or select 
different limits. Id. 
Prior to becoming an insurance agent, Warby was involved in an automobile 
accident wherein the lack of Uninsured Motorist coverage was an issue. (R. 0167-
70). Because of her experience in the accident and the lack of Uninsured Motorist 
coverage, it was her practice when the Randalls' insurance policy forms were filled 
out to share with each customer her personal experience with Uninsured Motorist 
coverage to recommend and explain UM, UIM, and UMPD Coverage in detail to 
each customer. Id. Warby's approach was consistent with Schroader-Blackley's 
policy and practice to have each customer sign a form if the customer desired to 
reject UIM coverage. (See id.; R. 0154-58.) 
The signed insurance application no longer exists because the Schroader-
Blackley Insurance Agency disposed of it after four years. Schroader-Blackley 
Insurance retained the signed insurance application for the current year and an 
additional three years. It disposed of the hard copy after the expiration of the time 
period established by the state of Utah for retaining insurance documents. (R. 0160-
0162); see also Utah Code Ann. §31A-23a-412. 
R 
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Randall did not pay a premium for Underinsured Motorist Coverage. (R. 
0169.) All of the existing records from Schroader-Blackley Insurance show that 
Randall rejected Underinsured Motorist Coverage. (R.0145-46, 0168-69, 0181.) 
Likewise, the records from Progressive show that Randall rejected UIM coverage 
and did not pay a premium for that coverage. (R. 0184.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The Court should affirm Judge Jones's decision to grant summary judgment 
in favor of Progressive because the undisputed material facts show that Randall 
rejected UIM coverage. Judge Jones deemed the facts in Progressive's brief 
admitted because Randall failed to comply with the requirements Rule 7(c)(3)(B) 
places on the non-moving party. Under that rule, Randall was obligated to provide 
a verbatim restatement of any fact he intended to dispute, and then explain the basis 
of his dispute with reference to admissible evidence. Randall did not properly 
dispute any facts, and the Court should affirm Judge Jones's decision that the 
material facts are deemed admitted. 
The Court should also affirm Judge Jones's decision to consider evidence of 
the contents of the UIM rejection form in the absence of the original. Under Rule 
1004, the Court may consider such evidence and it was proper for Judge Jones to 
do so. 
Finally, the Court should affirm Judge Jones's decision to grant summary 
judgment because Progressive is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Randall 
has erroneously urged the Court to reform the insurance contract because 
100.243 7 
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i 
Progressive can not physically produce the UIM rejection form that Randall signed. 
Randall's position, however, is not supported by the facts or the law he has cited. 
The UIM statute does not require the result Randall is espousing and Randall has 
not cited any admissible evidence to support his position. With the evidence on the 
record, the only conclusion a reasonable jury could reach is that Randall signed the 
UIM rejection form as part of his insurance application. Randall has not cited any 
admissible evidence to contradict that conclusion. 
ARGUMENT 
The Court should affirm Judge Jones's decision to grant summary judgment 
because: (I) Judge Jones correctly deemed Progressive's statement of facts 
admitted because Randall failed to comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(B); (II) an insurance 
company may prove the existence and contents of a UIM rejection form through 
circumstantial evidence; and (III) Judge Jones correctly granted summary judgment 
that Randall rejected UIM coverage. 
I. JUDGE JONES CORRECTLY DEEMED PROGRESSIVE'S STATEMENT 
OF FACTS ADMITTED BECAUSE RANDALL FAILED TO COMPLY WITH 
RULE 7(c)(3)(B) 
Randall failed to meet the requirements for an opposing memorandum to a 
motion for summary judgment under Rules 7 and 56 and Judge Jones correctly 
deemed Progressive's statement of facts as admitted.1 (R. 0192-0197.) Rule 56 
requires that a motion for summary judgment must "be in accordance with Rule 7." 
1
 In addition to making this argument, Progressive maintains that there are 
no genuinely disputed issues of material fact. 
« 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
a party failing to file such a response." Id. 56(e). 
Rule 7(c)(3)(A) requires the moving party to set forth facts it claims are 
undisputed in separate numbered paragraphs with references to the record. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A). The opposing memorandum must "contain a verbatim 
restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted" with an 
explanation of the dispute properly supported by citation to the record. Id. 7(c)(3)(B). 
The requirement is mandatory. Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT 
App 119,1J23,208 P.3d 1077 (Utah Ct. App. 2009); Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT 
App 25, 156 P.3d 175 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). 
In footnote 5 of the USA Power, LLC case, the Utah Supreme Court 
emphasized that Rule 7(c)(3)(B) requires a court to deem uncontroverted facts 
admitted. 2010 UT 31, p o n.5, 235 P.3d 749. That court wrote, "A trial judge has 
no discretion in deeming facts admitted unless controverted." Id. 
In this case, the Court should affirm Judge Jones's decision to deem the facts 
admitted because Randall did not include a verbatim restatement of Progressive's 
undisputed facts with an explanation of how those facts are disputed nor did he 
include a fact section with any citation to record evidence. Instead, Randall offered 
100.243 9 
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a blanket statement that he was not disputing facts 1,4,7,8,16, and 17, but he was 
disputing "all other 'facts.'" (R. 0193.) Randall's Memorandum in Opposition did not 
contain any specific reference to record evidence. See id. Randall did not cite any 
deposition testimony or refer to any specific documents in his opposing 
memorandum. 
Randall's failure to comply with the method mandated by Rule 7 prejudiced 
Progressive because it deprived Progressive of the opportunity to provide a 
meaningful response to the alleged disputes. Accordingly, Judge Jones made the 
correct decision to deem Progressive's facts admitted for the purpose of summary 
judgment. 
II. AN INSURANCE COMPANY MAY PROVE THE EXISTENCE AND 
CONTENTS OF A DOCUMENT THROUGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
Randall has asked the Court "to interpret [the UIM statute] in a manner that 
requires insurance companies to be able to physically produce a waiver form if they 
are going to assert that the insured signed or provided such an express writing 
rejecting underinsured motorist insurance." (Appellant Brief at 10-11.) The Court 
should decline that invitation because the UIM statute does not contain any provision 
that requires an insurance company to provide UIM coverage simply because the 
UIM rejection form becomes lost or destroyed. 
Utah's UIM statute requires the insurer to provide a form to the applicant, at 
the time of application, that contains a reasonable explanation of the purpose of UIM 
coverage and when it would be applicable. See Lopez v. United Automobile 
-inn OAI 10 
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Insurance Company, 2009 UT App 389,f!7, 222 P.3d 1192 (2009). The purpose 
for that requirement is to provide the insured with reasonable information about the 
coverage he or she is choosing to decline. In the context of the uninsured motorist 
statute, the Court of Appeals said, 
It is clear that Utah Code section 31 A-22-305(3)(b) is not.. . designed 
to simply memorialize the UM insurance decision after-the-fact. Rather, 
the 2000 amendment was specifically adopted in order to 'affirmatively 
inform' insureds about the costs of various levels of UM coverage 
before they decide whether to purchase it and in what amounts. 
General Sec. Indem. Co. v. Tipton, 2007 UT App 109, If 12,158 P.3d 1121 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2007). 
Stated differently, the statute does not preclude an insurer from proving the 
existence of the rejection form at a later time through other available evidence. If the 
form becomes lost or destroyed, the insurer can prove the existence and contents 
of the form through circumstantial evidence. UtahR. Evid. 1004. Judge Jones ruled 
correctly on that issue and granted summary judgment in favor of Progressive based 
on the available evidence. 
III. JUDGE JONES CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT 
RANDALL REJECTED UIM COVERAGE 
The Court should affirm Judge Jones's correct conclusion that Progressive 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. "A summary judgment movant, on an 
issue where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, may satisfy its 
burden on summary judgment by showing, by reference to the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
100.243 11 
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i 
affidavits, if any, that there is no genuine issue of material fact." Orvis v. Johnson, 
2008 UT 2,1f18-19,177 P.3d 600 (Utah 2008) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). "Upon 
such a showing, whether or not supported by additional affirmative factual evidence, 
the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. 
Progressive has satisfied its burden to show that Randall was presented with 
the UIM rejection form, and Randall has failed to show that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. He has asserted that Progressive, as the defendant, bears the burden to 
disprove his claim,2 but he has failed to present admissible evidence that supports 
his claim. Randall cited to an affidavit he signed on May 13, 2010 that was drafted 
by his attorney, but the statement contained in that affidavit was not subject to cross-
examination and it was not based on Randall's personal knowledge as demonstrated 
by his deposition testimony taken several months later on September 3, 2010. 
(Compare R. 0020 with R. 0174-75.) 
2
 Citing General Security Indemnity Company v. Tipton, 2007 UT App 109, 
158 P.3d 1121, Randall argued that the courts have shown a strong public 
interest in interpreting UIM statutes liberally. Randall's reliance on that case, 
however, is not on point and General Security is distinguishable for several 
reasons. The important fact in General Security Indemnity Company was that the 
insurance company did not even argue that it presented the plaintiff with a UM 
waiver form. Id. 1J2, n.2. As such, the court "assumefd] that Fulcrum never 
presented the acknowledgment form to Tipton . . ." and it Id. In this case by 
contrast, Progressive has presented affirmative evidence that it presented 
Randall with the UIM rejection form. 
mn 943 12 
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During his deposition, Randall admitted signing the application for insurance 
in several places, but he did not have personal knowledge of the information 
contained in the application forms. (R. 0174-75.) As such, he cannot competently 
testify as to whether he signed the UIM rejection form, Form #5597, that was part of 
the packet Progressive and Blackley-Schroader presented Randall to sign. Utah R. 
Evid. 602. 
The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence is that 
Randall signed the UIM rejection form provided by Progressive. That conclusion is 
underscored by the sequence of the application process and the procedures by 
which the UIM rejection form was generated. The Affidavit of Maria Warby 
establishes that she met with Randall and filled out an electronic application for 
insurance based on "the Randallsf] selections on coverage." (R. 0168). After the 
selection were made, "the insurance policy forms were printed out for the Randalls 
to sign." Id. Ryan Blackley, the owner of Blackley-Schroader Insurance Agency, 
testified that "[ajccording to which policy you're issuing, which coverages you are 
selecting, the insurance company . . . software will print out the forms that need to 
be signed and then we review that with the customer, obtain the signatures, obtain 
the down payment and issue the policy." (R. 0153.) The Affidavit of Carol Jones 
establishes that, based on Randall's policy number, he would have been provided 
Form #5597 to review and sign. (R. 0187-88.) Form #5597 provided Randall a 
reasonable explanation of the purpose of UIM coverage and when it would be 
applicable. 
100.243 13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The reason Form #5597 was presented to Randall was that he told Maria 
Warby he wanted to reject UIM coverage. That inference is not only supported by 
the chronology of events, but it is consistent with other pieces of circumstantial 
evidence such as the Declarations Page provided by Progressive indicating that UIM 
coverage was "Rejected" and that Randall did not pay a premium for UIM coverage. 
(R. 0184.) In addition, change forms generated by the insurance agency showed 
that UIM coverage was rejected. (R, 0145-46, 0181-82.) 
Randall's conduct lends further support to the conclusion that Randall rejected 
UIM coverage. Judge Jones noted on the record, 
It seems to me if he thought he had that coverage, when he got that 
billing statement in the mail and saw that under insured coverage had 
been rejected . . . he would have picked up the phone or gone to see 
the people and said, 'Wait a minute, I thought I had under insured 
coverage.' It shows right there on the billing statement it was rejected. 
(Hearing Transcript, Addendum A at 26; 13-19.) The UIM statute provides that a 
rejection "continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until the insured in writing 
requests underinsured motorist coverage from that liability insurer." Utah Code Ann. 
§31A-22-305.3(2)(g)(iii). Randall changed his coverage at least twice during the 
policy period, but did not make a single request to withdraw his rejection of UIM 
coverage. 
In the absence of affirmative evidence to the contrary, Randall has argued that 
the Court must conclude the missing form did not exist and that Blackley-Schroader 
Insurance Agency elected to reject UIM coverage against Randall's will. Those 
assumptions are not supported by the evidence and they are not reasonable 
100 243 14 
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inferences. Warby stated in her affidavit that it was her custom and habit to explain 
UIM coverage to her clients and have them sign the forms. (R.0169.) Warby took 
a personal interest in explaining to clients the benefits of UIM coverage because she 
had a personal experience in which she learned the benefits of having UIM 
coverage. Id. Additionally, the Court can take judicial notice that an insurance 
agency earns commissions by selling clients insurance coverage. It was in Warby's 
interest for Randall to purchase UIM coverage and she had no incentive to dissuade 
him from purchasing UIM coverage. Neither Progressive nor Blackley-Schroader 
had any reason to avoid selling Randall UIM coverage. In fact, their incentive was 
to try to persuade Randall to purchase UIM coverage. 
Contrary to Randall's position, the undisputed evidence shows that Warby 
inputted Randall's UIM rejection into the electronic application based upon Randall's 
own decision, that Progressive generated a UIM rejection form based on Randall's 
election, and that Warby presented Randall with Form #5597 as part of the 
application that Randall signed in several places. Judge Jones carefully considered 
those facts and the Court should affirm his decision to grant summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm Judge Jones' decision to grant summary judgment 
because there is no genuine issue for trial and the facts show that Progressive is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law that Rex Randall rejected UIM coverage at 
the time he entered into an insurance contract with Progressive. 
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1 like in June, and then Progressive filed one in December, right? 
2 I So I wonder in terms of batting order should we do Mr. Gould's 
3 first? 
4 MR. GOULD: I would think it's appropriate --
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 J MR. GOULD: -- to do mine first. 
7, L THE COURT: I might indicate I have had a chance to read 
8 the briefs that were submitted by both sides, so --
9 J MR. GOULD: Thank you. 
10 THE COURT: -- that will help. 
11 MR. GOULD: It's a lot of reading. 
12 THE COURT: It was. All right. If you want to first, 
13 then, Mr. Gould, I'll be glad to hear from you and then we'll 
14 I hear from Mr. Schriever. 
15 MR. GOULD: I anticipated your Honor would of course 
16 read the lengthy memorandum here. I thought about this case for 
17 awhile, and I thought, you know, I'm going to try and do the 
18 judge a favor and try and keep my argument on the short side. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. 
20 MR. GOULD: I kind of feel about this case that your 
21 Honor's going to do what you're going to do, and I'm not sure 
22 that the arguments we make are going to strongly impress you 
23 either way in this case. What I am going to say is this. I 
24 think despite the fact that we've had six relatively lengthy 
25 I memorandum in support or in opposition to two separate motions, 
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and it would seem relatively complex on its face, I can reduce 
this case and this argument to a pretty simple proposition. 
That proposition is this. This case really turns on 
what meaning your Honor chooses to give the statute 31A-32-305.3. 
I hate the read the sub parts, but there are sub parts, 
parentheses (2) parentheses (g) parentheses section (i) and 
section (ii). This section of the insurance code, as your Honor 
is probably aware at this point in time, is that section of the 
code which allows an insured who is seeking a policy from an 
insurance company to elect or to waive the coverage, elect to 
waive certain coverages. 
Under Utah law it is permissible to waive under insured 
motorist coverage, and it's permissible to waive uninsured 
motorist coverage. Of course, under insured motorist coverage 
is what we're here and what we're talking about. 
The legislature, though, deliberately made that process 
a difficult process. I think if your Honor peruses that statute 
in any length that you'll conclude that there is a public policy 
here, and that that public policy is to discourage the waiver 
of -- or the non-purchase at least of those coverages. The way 
the legislature has chosen to do that is its written a very 
specific process that must be followed into the statute. That 
statute requires that an insured -- perspective insured or actual 
insured give an express writing to the insurance company saying, 
"I do not want this coverage." 
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1 J Well, what we're here today about is the insurance 
2 company can't produce an express writing from my client saying 
3 that he waived this coverage, but yet is choosing to make an 
4 argument that even though it can't produce this express writing 
5 that it can somehow use other evidence to prove that this writing 
6 I was in fact made, did exist at one point in time, and that 
7 I Mr. Randall, my client, should be held and bound to the notion 
8 I that he waived this coverage. 
9 I Mr. Randall maintains that there was no waiver. He 
10 I maintains that if he had signed any document like that that he'd 
11 I remember it. That is his deposition testimony in this case. I 
12 think that the proposition here is very simple, it's just the 
13 legislature created a very specific process. 
14 While the statute may not contain actual language that 
15 says so, I think it's implicit in this statute, and what the 
16 legislature was saying here that they were telling the insurance 
17 company, "If you want to come to court or if you want to make the 
18 argument that there was a waiver of under insured motorist 
19 coverage, then insurance company, you produce that form." Don't 
20 come to court and make some kind of an argument that, "Well, we 
21 had this form at one point in time, but because of the fact the 
22 records weren't retained it was destroyed and so now what we're 
23 I going to do is try and make an argument that based on business 
24 practices where it was this standard business practice at an 
25 agency that these forms were used and these forms were provided 
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that the waiver must have been given." That's in essence 
Progressive Insurance's position in this case. 
My position is very simple. My position is is that this 
statute, whether it says so directly or not, the intention of the 
statute was that if the insurance company was going to make this 
argument it would actually be able to produce the written waiver 
that the insurance company -- the insurance agency supposedly 
obtained. 
I could go on and on. I could make other arguments. I 
think my memorandum points out in very good language from written 
treatises and this sort of a thing that these statutes were 
written primarily for the benefit of insureds rather than 
insurance companies. 
I could point out what I believe is a growing trend 
in a public policy here in Utah to try to see that people have 
adequate insurance when they're involved in accidents. That 
public policy first began when we passed a financial 
responsibility act years ago requiring people to have minimum 
limits of liability coverage. I believe that policy has been 
expanded and it continues by creating these statutes that make it 
difficult for people to waive under insured motorist coverage. 
I don't think that these positions should be any 
surprise or that they're radical or it's fashionable nowadays 
to call a lot of things socialistic. I think it's simply a 
recognition that when people get in accidents and they get hurt 
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1 I that they can have a lot of medical bills and there can be a lot 
2 of implications and a lot of costs, and that's why this policy is 
3 here. I'm content to end my argument on this motion on that 
4 note, your Honor. 
5 I THE COURT: Can I just ask you, though, Mr. Gould? 
6 MR. GOULD: Sure. 
7 I THE COURT: I mean let's assume just for the sake of 
8 argument they can't find the waiver. Isn't there something 
9 significant, though? According to what I read here, you agree, 
10 don't you, that your client didn't pay the premiums for under 
11 insured motorist? 
12 MR. GOULD: Yeah, that's correct, he didn't pay a 
13 premium for it. 
14 THE COURT: I mean isn't that significant here? Should 
15 he be entitled to coverage even though he never paid the premium 
16 for it? 
17 MR. GOULD: I tell you why I'm going to answer that yes. 
18 When you get your insurance bill in the mail, I mean you don't 
19 get a one sentence -- or a one line statement saying pay $200. 
20 You get a very involved statement that has a long list of 
21 coverages on it that are spelled out in three and four syllable 
22 words, typically, and I'm not sure sometimes that even as an 
23 attorney I completely understand everything the insurance company 
24 sends me in the mail. 
25 THE COURT: I kept thinking on one of the billing 
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statements that I looked at it lists the type of coverage, and 
out to the side it shows whether or not they're covered or 
whether he rejected it, and I thought one of those billing 
statements says he rejected the under insured. 
MR. GOULD: There is a form. 
THE COURT: Don't you think if he thought he had that 
coverage that he would have looked at the form and said, MGee, 
there's been a mistake," and call or notify the insurance 
company, "Hey, wait a minute, I should have been covered under 
this." 
MR. GOULD: I think some of people would have been --
what I'm saying is that I don't believe Utah law requires that. 
I don't believe that Utah law ever intended to put the burden 
on the insured in this kind of a situation. What the Utah law 
intended to do was to put the burden on the insurance company to 
prove that the man had waived his coverage. 
THE COURT: But isn't there other ways to prove that 
other -- for example, the best evidence, of course, would be the 
waiver, right? 
MR. GOULD: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: They don't have the waiver. 
MR. GOULD: Or a copy of it. 
THE COURT: Right. So they don't have that. Isn't the 
next best thing to look at is whether or not, you know, he -- on 
these forms whether or not he ever paid for under insured or 
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motorist coverage in mind when it was written. I would suggest 
that that statute -- all that statute does is it creates some 
kind of a minimum. It says you have to have these records for 
this period of time, and I suspect the real reason that that 
statute exists may have to do for purposes of like auditing, 
taxes. 
It may have to do with the insurance commission, the 
fact that insurance is a regulated business here in Utah -- I 
think everywhere. That's the reason for a statute like that. 
It certainly wasn't written with the idea that it would have some 
bearing on an under insured motorist claim that someone might 
bring. 
I want to point something else out, too. You know, this 
insurance company had notice that there was an. accident, and 
there was at least some insurance claim from its very inception. 
THE COURT: But didn't the claim come in after the four 
year --
MR. GOULD: The under insured motorist claim --
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. GOULD: -- came in after the period --
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. GOULD: -- under the records retention statute ran. 
For the insurance company to sit here and say, "Well, we didn't 
know that there was anything going on," I'm going to suggest that 
it's the insurance company's business if they're going to be 
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1 destroying records or not keeping these kind of things handy, 
2 it's their job to go out and ask questions. It's their job to 
3 I come to me, who they had a letter from, and say, "We're on the 
4 verge of destroying these records. Now do you think there's 
5 going to be an under insured motorist claim that's brought in 
6 this case?" 
7 I If they had done that I would have told them what I had 
8 thought we're pursuing a liability claim. If and when we get a 
9 tender of the liability policy limits in this case, then yes, I 
10 will be at that point in time pursuing an under insured motorist 
11 claim. 
12 They know what the laws are in Utah. For an automobile 
13 insurance company to sit there and pretend that, you know, we 
14 don't know that the laws in this state would allow someone making 
15 an under insured motorist claim to potentially, you know, make 
16 that claim, you know, after that three year record retention 
17 statute or something, I mean that is disingenuous for them to 
18 suggest that we -- you know, we have no awareness or idea that 
19 this is something that could happen. They are in a much better 
20 I position to protect themselves against something like that than 
21 a single uneducated insured person like Mr. Randall is. 
22 THE COURT: Let me just ask you one other question. 
23 You're not suggesting that the insurance company acted in bad 
24 faith, are you? 
25 MR. GOULD: No. No, I'm not suggesting that they've 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
-12-
acted in bad faith. 
THE COURT: I know the one statute talks about 
destroying records and there's certain exceptions, and one was 
bad faith. 
MR. GOULD: I'm not suggesting that they acted in bad 
faith, but what I'm suggesting is is that if they destroyed these 
records and now they're sitting here claiming that we're 
prejudiced, you know, we're in this situation that we shouldn't 
be in, I'm saying it's their fault because they probably have a 
thousand times more awareness of the problems that could result 
from that than someone like Mr. Randall has. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thanks, Mr. Gould. Mr. Schriever? 
MR. SCHRIEVER: Thank you, Judge. Having reread all the 
documents and everything that were submitted to the Court this 
morning, I'm going to submit that all of the evidence points to 
the conclusion that Mr. Randall rejected under insured motorist 
coverage, and that the only evidence that's in the record 
contrary to that is his testimony that he would have not -- or he 
would remember something if he had rejected it. 
The problem as I see it is that affidavit testimony has 
to be admissible in evidence, and I'm going to challenge the 
admissibility of those -- of that statement based on lack of 
personal knowledge. 
The deposition transcript cited by Counsel in his 
memoranda says that Mr. -- this is on page 29 of Mr. Randall's 
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deposition: 
A. I'm sure I'd remember it if I 
rejected something. 
The next question was: 
Q. Okay. I appreciate that and I'm 
going to get there, but I want to ask this 
piece by piece. 
And then we broke it down. 
Q. Do you recall receiving any forms 
whatsoever from Progressive that dealt with 
under insured motorist coverage? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you recall whether they provided 
you any forms dealing with the insurance policy 
at all that you had to sign? 
A. I know I signed a policy. I signed 
a form that's a policy form. 
Q. Okay. Where did you sign that? 
A. I think -- I'm thinking I signed it 
in the building of the office. 
Then we go on to the next page, the question begins: 
Q. What was contained in the form that 
you signed? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Do you remember how many pages it 
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1 I I believe the foundation is laid for that that was the form that 
2 I would have been used at the time. Ms. Warby's testimony is that 
3 she's very conscientious about having people sign this rejection 
4 I form. She doesn't have a specific recollection of having 
5 Mr. Randall it per se, but she always is conscientious to explain 
6 I that because she was caught in a personal situation where she did 
7 I not have UI coverage and she wished she had had it, and so her 
8 practice is to always sign that. 
9 I The form was then uploaded electronically from the 
10 Blackley Insurance Agency to Progressive with the rejection 
11 indicated. That form that contained the signatures was retained 
12 by Blackley. It never went to Progressive Insurance per se. 
13 Then Progressive sent out billing statements, policy renewal 
14 forms, and without fail each one of them indicated that the UI 
15 coverage had been rejected, and that there was no premium being 
16 collected for that coverage. That is what the evidence is, and 
17 those -- and that evidence is undisputed. 
18 Based on that evidence, if we were to present that 
19 evidence to a jury, the only reasonable conclusion a jury could 
20 make is that that form was presented to Mr. Randall, that he 
21 signed the form in several different places and that that form 
22 contained the UI rejection form and the signature that was then 
23 uploaded and that there were never any premiums paid on that. 
24 This in a way is kind of like someone going to a Wal-
25 Mart store and saying, "I came here five years ago and there was 
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1 a sale on a t.v., and I think I might have wanted to buy it, but 
2 I can't remember if I did. If you can't produce a receipt from 
3 that date that I didn't buy it, then you owe it to me and I'm 
4 going to walk out of it with -- out today." It just doesn't make 
5 sense. 
6 Counsel has indicated his thoughts that the statute 
7 contains clear language that the burden is shifted to the 
8 defendant to actually produce the express writing. I don't see 
9 any language in the statute that says that. The Rules of 
10 Evidence don't say that, and there's no case law that says that. 
11 What the burden is is to prove that the express writing 
12 existed at one point in time, and the undisputed facts do 
13 demonstrate that it did exist at one time, and that Mr. Randall 
14 signed that form on several different -- at several different 
15 locations. 
16 I'm happy to answer any questions the Court may have. 
17 I don't mean to ramble. There were some notes that I made as 
18 Mr. Gould was making his arguments. I'm not sure that they're 
19 really that material to the Court's consideration, but I'd be 
20 happy to address any other --
21 THE COURT: I guess the only question that -- so you 
22 just can't find the waiver, if there is one? I mean --
23 MR. SCHRIEVER: Right. Progressive's policy at that 
24 time was that the agency -- and this -- Blackley is an insurance 
25 brokerage. They don't just write for Progressive, they write for 
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1 other companies as well -- Traveler's. These folks actually 
2 bought another policy from them afterwards from -- I can't 
3 remember the name of the company -- United. 
4 THE COURT: So you can find the application for 
5 I insurance, but you just can't find if there was waiver or not? 
6 J MR. SCHRIEVER: No, the application contained the 
7 waiver, and that was put into a box in Blackley's storage. 
8 I THE COURT: Okay. Well, I guess the argument from 
9 Mr. Gould is the fact that you can find the application but not 
10 the waiver would suggest, I guess, that he never signed a waiver. 
11 Is that — 
12 MR. SCHRIEVER: That's not accurate, and let me try and 
13 explain. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. SCHRIEVER: The application was what was not 
16 retained by Blackley. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 MR. SCHRIEVER: So there's written application that the 
19 person has. That information is transmitted electronically to 
20 Progressive. 
21 THE COURT: So you don't even have the application? 
22 MR. SCHRIEVER: But the application itself, the written 
23 application is what Blackley retained, and they retained that for 
24 four years is what his testimony was, and then they discarded it. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-18-
MR. SCHRIEVER: Well, it's not — I was going to talk 
about Progressive's retention policies, but that's not in the 
record, it's not before the Court, so --
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SCHRIEVER: But the --
THE COURT: And so the application is gone, the waiver 
is gone if it was ever signed. 
MR. SCHRIEVER: Right. So what we've got is the 
testimony of Blackley as to what his policies and procedures 
were, testimony of the Progressive lady who was -- who has laid 
the foundation for what form was used at that time, and the 
testimony of Maria Warby, who was the agent who actually wrote 
and uploaded the policy as to what her standard procedures were. 
THE COURT: So from your standpoint for the insurance 
company, is it significant to you that he didn't pay the premiums 
for under insured? 
MR. SCHRIEVER: Well, I think it's very significant, 
Judge, because it's an indication that he had several 
opportunities to correct a problem if he had intended to purchase 
UI insurance. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SCHRIEVER: His acquiescence to that --
THE COURT: The other thing I noticed again, it's the 
automobile insurance coverage summary, it's marked as Exhibit 1 
in the -- and it says under insured motorist and it has rejected. 
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Was that something that would have been sent to him — to 
Mr. Randall? 
MR. SCHRIEVER: That is correct, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is that sent to him at the time that 
he applies for the insurance, this coverage summary or — 
MR. SCHRIEVER: Any time there was activity on that 
policy it would be sent to him, which would mean -- and I think 
that was --
THE COURT: His coverage began January 4th, 2006, expires 
July 4th, 2006. 
MR. SCHRIEVER: Yeah. So if there's a renewal on that 
policy then it's going to be sent. I think there was one in 
June that we marked as an exhibit as well that was a change in 
automobile coverage so it was sent again. So this was something 
that was sent out. I believe the payments were made 
electronically, so I can't state whether that was a monthly 
statement or not, but I do know that there would have been --
any time there was activity on that policy -- changes in policy 
that it would have been sent out. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then there's another one, there's 
another document in there that's marked as Exhibit 2. Let me 
see if that's -- anyway, it says the same thing, under insured 
motorist, and then out to the side it says rejected. So there's 
two different documents. It says this change is requested by 
Maria via internet on January 13th, 2006. I assume that would 
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have also gone to him; would it 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
SCHRIEVER: That's 
COURT: Okay.. All 
SCHRIEVER: No. I' 
not? 
correct. 
right. Anything 
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else? 1 
d be happy to address the I 
retention statute if you want me to. I don't th 
necessary, but --
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: Okay. 
SCHRIEVER: Thank you, Judge. 
COURT: All right. 
was it Schriver or Schriever? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
Thank you. Did 
SCHRIEVER: It is Schriever, but --
COURT: Schriever. 
SCHRIEVER: With a 
Sorry, I said S 
ink it's 1 
I get it wrong, 1 
chriver twice. 1 
name like Schriever you just -- 1 
you answer to just about anything. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry. 
Mr. Gould, any response to — 
MR. GOULD: I'll just -
or three things, and it's going 
I'm sorry about 
-- I'm going to a 
that. 
ddress two 1 
to conclude my argument. 
Mr. Randall's deposition testimony where he didn 
of the forms he signed in the insurance company' 
going to suggest that shouldn't surprise anyone 
know, I -- the law does not impose a requirement 
purchase insurance to remember things like that. 
the requirements on insurers to 
people have and do not have. 
prove the type o 
't remember some 
s office, I'm 
at all. You 
on people who 
The law imposes 
f insurance that 
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1 J Mr. Schriever is correct that the statute in question, 
2 I the under insured motorist waiver statute doesn't have specific 
3 J language in it saying the insurance company must produce the 
4 I express writing that it speaks of if there's a dispute like 
5 I this. I'm going to suggest that any other interpretation of that 
6 I statute makes it almost invalid, it makes it almost unnecessary 
7 I to have that statute (inaudible). 
8 Your Honor, I'm not trying to say that there is 
9 wrongdoing in this particular case. That's not my intention 
10 here, but stop and think about this one for a minute. If that's 
11 the interpretation that this statute is going to be given that 
12 the insurance company does not need to actually produce the 
13 express writing when this issue comes up, and instead the 
14 insurance company can fall back on things like, "Well, we'll have 
15 someone come to court and testify what our business practices of 
16 our agents were," even -- and even when they can't remember the 
17 specific person coming in they're going to come in and testify 
18 what their business practices were, that testimony is always 
19 going to be, "Yeah, we had a business practice where these people 
20 were given this form to sign, and they always signed the form and 
21 they either accepted it or they rejected the coverage." You're 
22 never going to have a case where that defense isn't made and 
23 where that testimony isn't given. I mean that's just the way 
24 the world works, and that's why it's necessary to give this 
25 particular interpretation to the statute that if the insurance 
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company wants to make this defense, it's got to give you a copy 
at least of the writing it claims the insured actually made 
saying, "I waive this coverage." 
Now your Honor makes some points. Your Honor makes 
some points about, you know, there were mailings to Mr. Randall 
saying that he didn't have this coverage, there were mailings to 
Mr. Randall saying that he'd waive the coverage. Mr. Randall is 
a very unsophisticated man. There's a lot of people out there 
who are very unsophisticated people. 
I haven't given Mr. Randall a literacy test, but I 
suspect if I did that he wouldn't score very high on it, and 
that's true of a lot of people out there. You may say well, so 
what. You know, I mean the insurance company's job isn't to test 
everybody's reading skills. 
Well, no, it isn't. That isn't their job, but their --
that's why it's all the more important that the burden be put on 
the insurance company in these situations to produce these waiver 
forms so that we don't have these kinds of disputes and we don't 
have these problems. 
How difficult would it have been to have kept these 
records? In this computer age, in this electronic world we live 
in, how difficult would it have been for an insurance company 
that had awareness that this accident had occurred to have hung 
on to this? I don't think it would have been even slightly 
difficult. These records were simply disposed of because there 
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was what 
in place 
I'm going to call kind of a brain dead corporate 
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policy 
saying after four years, or after however many years you 
get rid of the records. You know, no attempt on the part 
agent to 
of the 
contact Progressive and say, "Would there be a need to 
keep these particular records?" 
Mr. Randall and the rest of us shouldn't 
to what I'm going to call a bad corporate policy, 
be held hostage 
and it's a bad 
corporate policy to permit the destruction of these kinds 
records when the company knows that there is a cl 
pending. We wouldn't be here today fighting over 
had occurred. We'd have an answer one way or the 
you. 
else? 
and also 
First of 
straight 
aim that 
this if 
other. 
of 
is 1 
that 
Thank 
THE COURT: All right. Thanks, Mr. Gould. Anything J 
MR. SCHRIEVER: Nothing further, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. I appreciate the 
the motions. I think I'm ready to rule 
all, you know, it seems to me the facts 
forward. There doesn't seem to be a lot 
what happened, and of course, Mr. Randall applies 
insurance with Progressive Insurance Company. He 
through 
called -
believe, 
-- is it Schroeder-Blackley; is that what 
- Schroeder-Blackley Agency, and that too 
in June of 2005 initially. 
The agency or the agent retained the app 
arguments, 1 
on this 
are fair 
of dispu 
for aut 
:ase. 
iy 
te over 
Dmobile 
does that 
they're 
k place, 
lication 
I 
and 
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some of the forms for a period of four years, at least that's 
what they were supposed to do. They discarded those, however, 
all the forms before the plaintiff had actually filed his claims. 
So the hard copies, if you will, were all discarded. 
As you pointed out, under Utah state law, it mandates 
that they retain those for a period of one year, and that I 
believe is under 31A-23A-412 paren (5)(a), at least that's what I 
had out of your briefs. So there's a one year period that you're 
supposed to keep the applications, so he applies for insurance in 
June of >n5 and it's discarded in x06, I guess, the originals. 
Then the claim is filed sometime after that. 
According to the agency, the plaintiff elected to reject 
the under insured motorist coverage based on their review of the 
records and their forms. Of course, we don't have either the 
original or a copy of a waiver, if in fact it was signed, but 
that's the position taken by Progressive is that he must have 
elected to reject the insurance coverage based on a review of our 
records, meaning the agency's records. 
It's clear also from the memorandums and the motion that 
Mr. Randall did not pay the premiums for under insured motor 
coverage. Also the statements from Progressive, at least from 
the agents are that the plaintiff was not paying for under 
insured coverage, and their position is that he rejected, the 
under insured coverage, and there are a number of documents in 
the file indicating that. I think we've already talked about 
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they're part of the briefs and the memorandums indicating when 
you get down to under insured coverage out to the side it says 
rejected, so that's the position of Progressive. 
I know the position of Mr. Randall is that he doesn't 
really remember. He thinks he would have remembered if he made 
that decision. Of course, the position of Mr. Randall is that 
the burden is on the insurance company to keep those forms. If 
they don't have the forms then he's entitled to the presumption 
or the benefit that he must not have ever signed a waiver of that 
kind of coverage. 
There are a couple of things as far as ruling on the 
case. It seems clear that under Rule 1004 -- I guess that's the 
Utah Rules of Evidence -- that clearly you can prove forms were 
signed or that waivers were signed if the originals are destroyed 
and there's no bad faith. It seems clear that the originals have 
been destroyed, and frankly, there's no indication here -- I 
think I asked Mr. Gould if they were alleging bad faith by the 
insurance company, and he said no. 
So since the original -- the hard copy has been 
destroyed, it seems clear that the insurance company can use 
copies and they can use circumstantial evidence to prove whether 
or not the waiver was ever signed or not signed. Again, that's 
Rule 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
To me what this boils down to really is the question of 
whether he ever paid the premiums. I just -- I'm having a tough 
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time as a judge believing that he ever did anything concerning 
the waiver when he's not paying the premiums. It doesn't seem 
fair to me that he should get the benefit of under insured 
coverage if he's not paying the premium. I understand your 
argument, Mr. Gould, that somehow he may not be sophisticated, 
but it seems to me that he didn't ask for under insured coverage. 
If he would have, they would have docked him with paying those 
premiums for under insured coverage. It doesn't seem that he 
should get the benefit of that coverage if he's not paying the 
premium. 
The other argument is -- again is the billing 
statements. There are several billing statements that show that 
he rejected that coverage, under insured insurance. It seems to 
me if he thought he had that coverage, when he got that billing 
statement in the mail and saw that under insured coverage had 
been rejected, either by him or by -- he would have picked up the 
phone or gone to see these people and said, "Wait a minute, I 
thought I had under insured coverage." It shows right here on 
the billing statement it was rejected. 
Again, it's -- there's no violation of the law to 
destroy records after three years. There's nothing illegal about 
it under 31A-23A-412.5. So the Court's going to find that 
clearly the originals have been destroyed. There's no bad on 
the insurance company. The insurance company can use copies and 
records to try to determine or answer the question of whether or 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-27-
not he signed the waiver of coverage. The Court's going to find 
that he did not have under insured coverage and didn't request 
it, that he had -- the plaintiff really had rejected the 
coverage, even though we can't find the waiver. 
The other thing that I wanted to comment on, and that 
is that it was pointed out in the defendant's brief, in 
defendant's motion for summary judgment, Mr. Gould, you never 
really addressed some of the facts that they were alleging in 
their brief. So my understanding of the law is that if you don't 
address those, they're deemed to be admitted. So based on your 
answer to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Court 
has to deem that all of the facts alleged in the defendant's 
brief -- in Progressive are deemed to be admitted, and I think 
that's Rule 7 and Rule 56. 
So based on that, the Court is going to grant summary 
judgment for the defendant -- for Progressive -- and deny the 
motion for summary judgment for the plaintiff. Now anything I 
needed to cover or clarify in the ruling? 
MR. SCHRIEVER: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Schriever, would you prepare 
the order and submit that to Mr. Gould? 
MR. SCHRIEVER: Yes, your Honor. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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